

NORBERT LEŚNIEWSKI

**HOW TO REGAIN THE UNITY OF *LOGOS*,
PATHOS AND *ETHOS*?**

The aim of my paper is to present the forgotten suggestion made by Heidegger which can be found in his *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*¹. Heidegger interprets the Aristotle's definition of a man as *zoon logon echon*: it is no longer the traditional understanding of a rational animal, but rather *being-here-in the world* for which an involvement in conversation and discursivity, i.e. *logos* is *modus* of being. *Logos* of that living being is the everyday discourse of our practical communication with others, rather than scientific and dialectical-theoretical syllogisms. It is exactly the discourse that is undertaken by rhetoric.

I. Rhetorical starting-point

The classical structure of rhetoric that has a form given to it by Aristotle may be presented in the following way:

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, Vorlesungsnachschrift von Walter Bröcker (Marburg, SS 1924), *Herbert Marcuse Archiv*, „Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main“. Since these lectures have not been translated into English yet, all quotations are in German.

FUNCTIONS	KINDS	STYLES	PRINCIPLES
LOGOS (reason)	judicial rhetoric (convincing persuasion) popular in jurisdiction (past tense)	simple (without tropes) popular in philosophy, debates etc.	organicity (veracity – the inner order, arrangements of parts)
PATHOS (emotion)	evaluative and demonstrative rhetoric (stimulating rhetoric) popular in agitation (present tense)	middle; its objective is to engender admiration	aesthetic and stylistic propriety
ETHOS (will)	consultative, deliberative rhetoric (inciting rhetoric) popular in politics (future tense)	high or sublime popular in propaganda	functionality (strict objectives)
RULE OF FUNCTIONS UNITY	RULE OF KINDS HARMONY	RULE OF STYLES HARMONY	RULE OF PRINCIPLES UNITY

However, in *Being and Time* we can read that it is not an accident that the earliest systematic Interpretation of affects that has come down to us is not treated in the framework of ‘psychology’. Aristotle investigates the ‘pathe’ in the second book of his ‘Rhetoric’. Contrary to the traditional orientation, according to which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we ‘learn in school’, this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another². From Heidegger’s point of view, the formal structure of rhetoric (as presented above) has its own primordial source in the onto-hermeneutics of Dasein’s everydayness. Thus, we can say that Aristotle’s rhetoric deals with the discursivity of facticity (*Lebenswelt*). Therefore, the rhetorical *logos*:

1. manifests itself in the very roots of the language,
2. is the ground of the possibility of speaking,
3. is the base upon which every theoretical uttering of a thing itself is rested (*logos ousias*).

Heidegger holds that rhetoric is a disposed discourse of Dasein in the world (*befindliches Reden des Daseins in der Welt*) – so, finally, rhetorical *logos*:

1. is primordial to the detailed and abstract forms of expertise (theoretical observation),
2. and being consultative its objective is not only to influence the listeners’ opinions but to persuade them to make a decision (*krisis*).

² M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1990, p. 178.

The most important things here are, firstly, *ethos* – the community of the orator’s and listener’s *modi* of being and, secondly, *pathos* – the listener’s mood which means the way he finds himself there (*befindet sich*). Thus, *logos* produces mood – *pathos* – not only as some state or present frame of mind, but also as the frame of the world, emotional space where the world originally manifests itself.

II. *Pathos* as dis-position (*Befindlichkeit*)

According to Heidegger’s most known work, we are always in some situation, in some state of affairs. Thus, we are always *Being-in*, i.e. in thrownness we find ourselves somewhere – the first and fundamental characteristic of such being is the *Befindlichkeit*. *What we indicate ontologically by the term Befindlichkeit is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned*³. Thus, within the context of *Being and Time*, there seems to be a good reason to acknowledge that all moods are to be understood as ontic instances of what can be grasped on the ontological level as the fundamental structure of *Dasein*, namely, *Befindlichkeit*. Finally, moods are the ontic correlate of *Befindlichkeit*. But, as it is well known, the existential concept of *Befindlichkeit* is the Heideggerian translation of Aristotle’s metaphysical category: „disposition” (*diathesis*). However, what is not well known, is that Heidegger derived this notion not directly from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, but from his *Rhetoric*. In order to grasp the original meaning of *Befindlichkeit*, let us turn to Heidegger’s *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*.

What is the most radical hermeneutical gesture in Heidegger’s *Grundbegriffe*... is his passage from the *ousiologic* to *kairologic*. Speaking from the logical point of view, Heidegger does not look for what is the first and necessary assumption of thought, but rather for what the very origins of thinking alone are. Moreover, speaking from the hermeneutical point of view, his main aim is to uncover an original space of an ontological *field of possible understanding*. This hermeneutical gesture to grasp it at once, consists in translating the metaphysical term *ousia* to *Da-sein*, thus, from now on, *Being-in* is to be understood as *How of being*. Disposition – *pathos* – itself is then what determines a human being in each of its determination:

1. disposition is a kind of positioning, it is a way in which we have ourselves, and much more important than *what* we have is rather *how* we find ourselves situated – this is Heidegger’s way of understanding the *having* in the meaning of *being-in*,
2. passions are the *ground out of which speech grows* – *fear is the kind of disposition which brings us to speech* – hearing is a necessary element of the open structure of discourse or speech and belongs to it,
3. disposition is the way of finding ourselves in the world, it is the way of concern – we can say that disposition is the *How* of concern, however, passions, moods and affections are what change our decision and discourse – without passions as fearing and, especially, hearing there is no new way of concern for our world,

³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

4. as the *How* of concern, the disposition is the primordial and original *field of possible understanding* on the base of which we are able to construct further theories which should be understood as a manner of perceiving our own world,
5. as the *How* of the concerning discourse, disposition is communicated to the others with passion, then it is negotiated and commonly shared in *polis* or, as Kisiel expresses: *Being-with-one-another is therefore speaking with one another in our common concern with being-in-the-world*⁴.

Generally speaking, *pathos* (disposition or *Befindlichkeit*) is an answer to the question: *How* human being is a *being-in-the-world*? For *being-in* is always being in such a way that *Dasein* is moved by the shocking character of moods, passions, affections and feelings.

Finally, Heidegger's rhetorical ontology or, even better, protopractical ontology is just such a *field of possible understanding* that Aristotle's ontico-logical concepts become the onto-hermeneutical ones. For Heidegger, the means and end sought for in action are the *kairos*: feeling and acting *at the right time, on the right occasion, toward the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner*⁵. *Kairos* – situation – is never the same, because *pathos* (disposition) itself is an active and changeable quality which changes and repeats passions, moods and feelings. And this is the very core of *kairologic*, i.e. hermeneutics of facticity.

Summing up, in his *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes three essential characteristics of *pathos* (disposition):

1. *pathos* discloses *Dasein* in its thrownness in the manner of an *evasive turning-away*;
2. the world, *Dasein*-with, and existence are equiprimordially disclosed; and *pathos* is a basic existential kind of their disclosedness, because this disclosedness itself is essentially *Being-in-the-world*;
3. *Dasein*'s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a disposition⁶.

In the perspective of *kairologic*, each *there* or every situation is opened or closed by disposition, and more precisely by moods. In other words, thrownness itself means existentially finding oneself in some-how disposition. Disposition is a way of *Dasein*'s thrownness, it is its *How* – every mood, passion or feeling of *Dasein* is its *How* of thrownness. Disposition is, thus, a primordial mode of grasping our own *Dasein* or, as Heidegger said, *one's mood discloses in the manner of turning thither or turning away from one's own Dasein*⁷.

⁴ Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1995, p. 295.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

⁶ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

III. *Ethos* as understanding (*Verstehen*)

There are few meanings of *ethos* in the common tradition:

1. leading beliefs and ideals which describe a group, society or nation;
2. the set of values which stand for the base of norms and models of behaviour;
3. character or individuality of a human being especially regarding her/his balance between passions and deliberation;
4. basic worldview or moral attitude.

As it is well known, the third meaning is found by Aristotle and this is exactly the meaning that Heidegger refers to.

According to Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy, in a rhetorical situation and precisely in a situation of speech, as Kisiel views this, *ethos* is not just a character, let alone 'moral' character, but [it] is to include both where the speaker is coming from and in particular how he projects himself out of this thrownness: 'His entire existence speaks along with what he speaks for', demonstrating whether he is trustworthy as a person, familiar with his subject-matter, well-disposed toward his audience⁸. The three elements mentioned by Kisiel, i.e. credibility, familiarity and disposition are strictly connected with Aristotle's rhetorical *rule of functions unity* (see table above), i.e. *logos* (reason), *ethos* (will) and *pathos* (emotions). However, in Heidegger's hermeneutical reformulation, the rhetorical *rule of functions unity* has an entire new meaning. This is no longer just a formal and methodical indicator of the rhetorical correctness, but rather the original dimension of proper *being-there*. Following Kisiel, we may call the way Heidegger understood this rule, *protopractical understanding*, for that the inherently practical nature of life was what Heidegger based his ontology on.

In such a protopractical ontology horizon *logos* has a meaning of deliberation accorded with *the rhythms of everyday public life*, aimed at the auditors to direct them toward the expected view of a thing and to change their disposition as well. And all this in order to exert an influence on their decision. Familiarity is the only way to achieve this aim, but it is also the hardest way to take, for it is based on a changeable disposition: passions, moods and feelings, in general – *pathos*. As Heidegger expressed this: *this lack of familiarity is not something occasional and temporary, but rather belongs to the temporality of encountering the world as such. [...] The 'mostly always somehow other' dominates our encounter with the world*⁹. Familiarity, i.e. *pathos*, is the most important kind of persuasion, because it inspires the most common credibility of the speaker's *ethos*.

According to Heidegger, *ethos* in general is an ethical dimension of the speech situation where a response to the call of situation takes place. *Arete*, one of the main concepts of the Aristotelian ethics, is strictly related to the *ethos*. And because *arete*, as Heidegger insists, *ist ein Wie des Daseins, nicht als feste Eigenschaft sondern als Wie des Daseins bestimmt durch dessen Sein, charakterisiert durch die Zeitlichkeit, durch die*

⁸ T. Kisiel, „Situating rhetorical politics in Heidegger's protopractical ontology (1923-1925: The French occupy the Ruhr)”, (in) *Existentia* Vol. IX, Budapest 1999, p. 20.

⁹ See: M. Heidegger, *Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, K. Bröcker-Oltmanns (ed.), Gesamtausgabe Vol. 63, Klostermann Frankfurt/M. 1988.

*Erstreckung in die Zeit. Daher ist die arete und wird sie 'etous', durch die Gewohnheit*¹⁰. Thus, *ethos* is the resultant of a provenience and projection, of thrownness and possibility. Moreover, *arete* is what is the most specific to our own behaviour, but its genesis does not lead to nature, especially our nature which is understood as something given in advance, something inherent to our essence. The genesis of *arete* reaches some completely other origins, it is the original *ousia* interpreted as *Da-sein* – *being-there* which every human being existentially already is. For that reason and only in that specific meaning Heidegger used to say that *arete* is in the *ousia*. Since *ousia* is *being-there*, *die arete ist auf die 'praxis' bezogen, die 'arete ethike' auf das 'ethos', ihre Genesis ist das Sich-gewöhnen im Sinne des öfteren Durchmachens*¹¹.

Therefore, the ethical virtue has other sources than the *arete dianoetike* – a kind of knowledge which possesses determined object and which always demands experience and time. According to Heidegger, Aristotle brings the *arete ethike* and the *ethos* itself together, and because of that, one does not ought to be either young (or old) or experienced (or naive) in order to be truly ethical human being. In this original horizon being ethical means to be disposed and speaking according to the common public opinion.

Ethos is what Heidegger will later call understanding. This primarily understanding of the temporally particular situation enables *Dasein* to project a proper possibility or, in other words, to make a proper decision. If that decision is made with understanding of the *arete ethike*, then it is the ethical one. However, in order to be the ethical human being, i.e. in order to be in accordance with what one has and by what one is being had, shortly, to grasp the *arete ethike*, apart from being in the very middle of what is happening, one needs also to choose the centre between and amongst passions and possibilities. And this demands the proper understanding of one's own *pathos* (disposition) and *logos* (discursivity), moods and multivocality.

Just for this reason, it is so hard to be good and for the same reason the most often measures used in the *field of possible understanding* are not logical proofs, but rather *enthymeme* which in Heidegger's translation means „bringing to the heart”. Finally, we can say that to be a properly ethical human being, to originally understand one's own *Da-sein*, one has to hear and obey the call of one's conscience.

IV. An original *logos* as discourse (*Rede*)

As we have mentioned above, the rhetorical *logos* produces *pathos* not only as some state or present frame of mind, but also as the frame of the world, emotional space where the world originally manifests itself. *Pathos* is an uninterrupted continuum of a subject and the world where *Dasein* encounters things. Moreover, an original *logos* is a discourse which is often modified in the following ways: reason, ratio, relation. As a discourse, *logos* is the manifestation of what is talked about. Such *logos* has an

¹⁰ M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe...*, op. cit., p. 71.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

apophantic character – it lets something appearing be seen. However, what appears is seen by *logos/discourse* as something and, thus, it makes a synthesis – *logos means letting something be seen in its togetherness with something – letting it be seen as something*¹². Thus, the real *logos* is not an adequacy with what is talked about. What matters is that *the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of the hiddenness, must be seen as something unhidden*¹³. And conversely, false *logos* is covering up: it puts something in front of something and thereby passing it off as something which it is not. The truth of *logos* is originally aesthetic and refers to sense experience, i.e. to what is seen.

In respect of the ability to make a phenomenal entity seen, *logos* has the meaning of reason; for it gathers (*legein*) what is seen, for it lays the basis, *logos* has the meaning of ratio; and since, on the other hand, it makes something visible as something, it has the meaning of relation. Our interpretation leads towards the following notion of *logos*: *logos* is the gathering which is prior to the statement and to the one who speaks in accordance with *logos* he expresses the truth of being disposed as disclosedness. Therefore, a statement, contrary to Aristotle, is not the *locus* of truth. *Logos* is a movement in terms of a continuous gathering of the understandingly being in some situation. *Logos* is, thus, a synonym of the understanding activity which is an ontological-existential interpretation. Lastly, Heidegger's *logos* is the movement of interpretation within the field of possible understanding, it is the disposed (*pathos*) understanding (*ethos*).

Thus, the primordial *logos* – which is useful only while expressing the attuned understanding of being with one another – has to reach what is common for us, what is commonly shared in our disposition and understanding, i.e. *pathos* and *ethos*. But what is truly primordial is not only common in the sense of technical usefulness – what counts here is not only a common hammer or technologies – it is the primordial understanding before properties and patents. The original *logos* is derived from the space of the renewed and reinterpreted Aristotle's ontology where *ousia* no longer means the essence which every thing and each human being possesses, but it is understood as *being-in* – always some-where (*ethos*) and some-how (*pathos*). And this is the new kind of ontology that is weaker than the traditional one, because it employs another meaning of *logos*. Such a primordial *logos* designates another *field of possible understanding* on the base of which what is talked about is where and how we are – is our *being-in* and *being-with*. And on account of being to which the primordial *logos* is always related, it is better to speak of an *onto-logos*, and further, for the sake of a practical dimension of that being it is finally an ontology of practical life.

According to this practically reinterpreted logos, the way of reasoning and arguing has to be modified: Sofern über etwas gesprochen wird und eine Überzeugung ausgesprochen werden soll, muss der 'syllogismus' ein verkürzter sein, weil der Hörer, zu dem man in der Volksversammlung spricht, einfach ist, er kann nicht von weit her schliessen, hat ein kurzatmiges Denken, er kann einen Gedankenzusammenhang, der von weither kommt, nicht zusammennehmen, deshalb muss die Art des Aufzeigens eine

¹² M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 56.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

andere sein: ‘enthymema’, so, *der Beweis ihm mehr zu Herzen geht*¹⁴. Aristotle has, of course, also distinguished syllogisms. According to him the premises in both rhetoric and dialectic are more primordial than theorems in logical syllogisms. Both dialectic and rhetoric begin and end their conclusions by propounding opinions while the theorem is nothing but an old opinion and the conclusion is a new one.

According to Heidegger, opinion (*endoxa*) is a way of primordial orientation among beings which may be other than they are. These beings are subject to the permanent revision. Thus, the old opinion (*endoxa*) stands for Heidegger’s *Vorgabe*. As a premise, it takes the shape of *erotesis endoxos* or asking questions within the field of what is already our opinion. Contrary to the theorems of logical syllogisms, the dialectical and rhetorical premises uncover undetermination and contingency in the internal element of asking questions – we ask for concession and beforehand recognition of what we ask about. It is a case because rhetoric effects the temporal and narrative-historical aspect of human matters. Furthermore, rhetoric demands decisions from individuals: in the consultative form – *ethos* – deals with what has not happened yet; in the juridical form – *logos* – deals with what has already happened and, lastly, in evaluative form – *pathos* – deals with what exists. For that reason Heidegger holds that the difference between the dialectical and logical syllogisms and the enthymeme usually lies in the fact that the latter has only one clear premise and the former has two. That difference is derivative to the etymological meaning of the enthymeme: „to take something to the heart.” Dialectical and logical syllogisms are apothantic – they make something visible, and that is why they are theoretical. On the contrary, the rhetorical enthymeme is practical – it influences somebody’s will to make him participate in what is presently going on.

Summing up:

1. demonstrative *logos* (logic) is monological, private and apothantic – one may show oneself a reason without referring to someone else. The *logos* of a monological demonstration presents to silent spectators the conclusions which should be derived from the correct insight and led to self-evident truths,
2. the *logos* of a dialectical conversation (dialectics) takes into consideration two opposing opinions reaching mutual understanding of perceiving the object discussed – it is also theoretical, but never self-evident,
3. the *logos* of a rhetorical deliberation and consulting leads also to understanding but in the way of practical and existential engagement – its object is practical, because it is related to the common activities in the common world. The rhetorical *logos* not only changes the way of seeing the thing, but, at the same time, it changes what we feel and want in the face of it. It influences our opinion but also forces us to make decisions (*krisis*) and to choose (*prohairesis*). This is a result of listening to what the others are saying – this is the dimension that is closest to the originally understood politics.

Moreover, the aim of the primordial *logos* is an agreement, an agreement on activities rather than on some statement. The *logos* is addressed to its listeners, not to spectators. That is why the agreement and conviction (*pistis*) are not proofs, for the original hermeneutics of facticity does not explain nor define, but understands and interprets. Such a *logos* leads either to conviction and trust in understanding and

¹⁴ M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe...*, op. cit., p. 51.

engagement or to disbelief and disobedience – that is the reason why understanding like acting is neither true nor false. The *logos* of demonstration and conversation demands an answer: „Yes, I see it in this way (No, I don't see it in this way)”, while *logos* of rhetoric: „Yes, I will do it (No, I won't do it)”¹⁵. The original *logos* manifests itself in the experience of what is passing by and that is the very reason why it appears in the kind of discourse that tells the history of the world. The onto-hermeneutical *logos* reasons through the standard sequences of language, so it concerns everything that is contingent, temporal and inner contradictory by giving the only effect of probability – it remains underdetermined. And finally, the original *logos* was heard in the words as the *onomata* of natural, pre-conceptual discourse (*Rede*) and only later on it became a silent sign – *semeia* – meaning the universal essences.

As we have seen, the possibility of regaining the wisdom understood as the unity of *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* is a deeply hermeneutical one and the effect of that unity is the radical hermeneutics of everyday experience. For the hermeneutical *logos* achieves understanding only for the time being and, next, it repeats the process of interpretation of the Being meaning. And since the original *logos* is impassioned in its rationality, the onto-hermeneutics has to be an-archic from the very beginning and it could be valid as long as it is in action, i.e. as long as the *logos* – everyday discourse – lasts. However, in my opinion, which is opposed to Rorty's *conversation of mankind*, Heidegger (of the twenties) suggests that this kind of discourse concerns not only possibilities of understanding but also their sources. What is worth noticing is, to repeat Kiesel's remark, that *this is not as arch-conservative as it sounds, when we couple it with a sense of being that is always that which 'can also be otherwise', especially in the generational exchange at the core of historicity*¹⁶. As the unity of *pathos* and *ethos* opens up a new field of possible understanding of the original *logos*, the deeper this *logos* is understood, the wider it can be used and applied.

Human being, to finish at the point we begun, is even for Aristotle, first of all, not a rational animal, but rather a living being dwelling in the ordinary language and the main task of the radical hermeneutics of *onto-logos* is to interpret the roots of being with one another. A philosophical proof is therefore neither demonstrative nor irrevocable, but argumentative and (more or less) deliberative. And this is why in his *Metaphysics* and *Topics*, Aristotle argued not inductively, but rhetorically even in support of what he considers to be the most secure and primary *arche* and premise of all – the law of noncontradiction. Thus, opposed to the demonstrative logic, the point of departure for every radical hermeneutical reasoning and understanding remains underdetermined in the same way as the original *logos* does – the *logos* which could be properly understood as a discursivity (*Rede*) that is *eine Grundbestimmung des Daseins selbst*.

¹⁵ See: P. Christopher Smith, *The Hermeneutics of Original Argument*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois 1998.

¹⁶ T. Kiesel, „Situating rhetorical politics...”, op. cit., p. 28.