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THE ONTO-THEOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF PLAY: HERACLITUS AND PLATO

In the history of philosophy, the orientation of attention towards the concept of play starts in the pre Socratic period. Of course, the “History of Philosophy” that has been mentioned herein, is the history of “Western Philosophy”. Otherwise, we could say that, the history of the concept of play had spread out to a wide geography and relied on much further back in time, since out of what we had learned from David L. Miller; the thought of play had been present in the Eastern Philosophy, as well as being referred to in the *creation* stories of the ancient religions. For instance, in accordance with the Vedantic interpretations of the ancient Hindu chantings of creation, the world as we know it, is an outcome of the play (in Sanskrit, the term is referred to as “*lila*”) of God. Whereas the animals, plants and the inorganics are the *māyā*, namely, the divine power of illusion. All the craft of God who had been seen as the greatest master of the art of illusion, was hidden in His like for the hide and seek play. Everything in the world had been created by God and He undertakes the work of creation by transforming Himself into various forms. Miller mentions that these sayings regarding the creation by God as a play and in relation the world could be found in *Bagavatam Purana* and *Vishnu Purana* dating back approximately to the eighth century (Miller 1970 : 99 – 102) .

In the light of the above-mentioned explanations, we see that the thought of play has got a religious context as well and it could be said that the religious *œuvres complètes* on

this subject has significance from the point of view of philosophical thought. For instance, it has been known to the historians of philosophy that the philosophies of certain ancient Greek Philosophers had been affected by the ancient Greek Orphism. First and foremost, Pythagoras is provided as an example to the said affect. It has been claimed by the historians that most of the principles and beliefs of the order founded by Pythagoras had been taken from Orphism¹. Another important example is, some of the philosophical sayings of Heraclitus, if we rely on Nietzsche. It has been asserted that Nietzsche resorted to certain items included in the myths of Greek Orphism for the purposes of interpreting the famous 52 (B) fragment² of Heraclitus regarding play, especially in his book titled “*Philosophy in the Tragic Era of the Greeks*” (*Die Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitaler der Griechen*) (Miller 1970 : 187n5) . It has been mentioned that Nietzsche wanted to show that “the origin of Heraclitus' aphorism is traceable to the ancient Greek Orphic religion, whose myths include stories of their high god, Dionysos, pictured as a little child playing with toys.” (Miller 1970 : 103) . In other words, it has been claimed that it is possible to make a connection between the saying by Heraclitus and certain elements of the ancient Greek Orphism, over the thought of play, through Nietzsche. Similar examples could be increased if one had wanted to; but the very self of the example contained herein, is not an example that could only be related through a religious context, but at the same time constitutes a starting point in the history of philosophy on account of the thought of play. So, since we will discuss the play concept from the point of view of its onto-theological origin or history in this essay, it will be useful to pay a little bit more attention to the 52nd fragment of Heraclitus, which is mentioned within the said example.

1. Heraclitus's Aion and His Transformations

The saying is as follows :

αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων, πεττεύων· παιδὸς ἢ βασιληίῃ (Aion is a child playing draughts; the kingship is the child's) (Krell 1972 : 64) . This is the translation of the fragment in Greek by Krell. There are many versions of the translation of the fragment³. Whereas Miller translates the sentence as “Time (aion), is a child playing (pais paidzon), moving counters on a game board. The kingdom (basileie) belongs to the child (paidos)”

¹ See (Weber 1993 : 11 fn2) for general information on the influence of Orphic and Greek Philosophy and for Pythagoras see (Gökberk 1974 : 38).

² The numbers of fragment with regard to Heraclitus and Parmenides are the numbers given by Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz in their compilation titled “Die Fragmente der Vorsokratier, griechisch und deutsch”.

³ For example, this fragment in the texts and explanations related to the Ancient Philosophy by Kranz is as follows : “Time (aion) is a child playing and making a move with a draughtsman: the play of the kingdom of a child!” (Kranz 1994 : 64) or the translation by Diels: “Time is a child (Knabe) playing the draughts; The child regime! (Knabenregiment)” (Diels 1922 : 88). In addition there is the translation within the book by John Burnett, published in the year 1892 with the title “Early Greek Philosophy” goes like this: “Time is a child playing the draughts. The Kingly power is a child's”.

(Miller 1970 : 102). The translation by Heidegger where he fed the text with his own interpretation of it is as follows: “The *Geschick* of being, a child that plays, shifting the pawns: the royalty of a child -that means, the *arkhé*, that which governs by instituting grounds, the being of beings. The *Geschick* of being: a child that plays”. (Heidegger 1991 : 113; 1997 : 169). Many more examples could have been given for the translation of the fragment. We could put together these translations in two basic categories. The first are the translations by Diels, Kranz, Burnet, etc ... which we could call philological and which we have made examples of herewith, namely the ones in which not much of philosophic interpretations have been added to; and the second are the translations by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Fink which we could call *philosophical readings*. When we are to consider these two categorical reading types, we find out the following: The difficulty that has been come across most commonly in the philological and even in the philosophical readings of the fragment is the translation of the word αἰών (aion). This word sometimes has been translated as “time” and sometimes as “life span”. There are others who has translated as “life” and “life time” as well (Rifat 2003 : 50). In *The Dictionary of Philosophical Terms*, F. E. Peters suggests the translations of “life span” and “eternity” for the word αἰών. And he claims that the difference between time as *khronos* which contains the past, the future and the present; and time as *aion* which refuses the periodical separations between the past and the future and verifies all within the present had been hinted at by Parmenides. (Peters 1967 : 7) Accordingly Peter claims that the word αἰών is included in a conceptual manner in Parmenides and shows his the 5th line of his 8th fragment as the grounds for it. Although the 5th line of Parmenides’s 8th fragment is οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν⁴ and does not contain the word αἰών, this expression tells about the temporal condition of *One*, ἔν in the following line. If we take another look at the meaning of the word depending also on some of the philological readings, we could say that what has been meant by the word αἰών as “time” or “life time” is not the known time and the known life time, but something else is being marked by the said word. What was marked could have been the eternal and temporal condition of *One* from a Parmedinic point of view like it had been expressed by Peters, or could have been the being’s “modality” from a Plotinistic point of view (Peters 1967 : 8). If we are to take a look at the other words of the fragment, we could see that the others had not created such difficulties as αἰών and the philological translations of the expression are almost similar to each other grammatically.

As for the *philosophical* readings of the fragment... Without doubt, one of the most important reading is the one by Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s reading had not been limited to the philological context of the expression and at the same time his interpretations had been a source of inspiration for the philosophers of the 20th century who are also his successors such as Heidegger, Derrida, Gadamer, and Fink in their thoughts on the concept of play. Nietzsche says “According to Heraclitus, the universe (Die Welt)⁵ is a

⁴ When the expression “ἔν, συνεχέες” on the 6th line is taken into consideration, the translation by Walter Kranz is as follows: “Neither it existed for once, nor it shall exist, since there is a whole now. A wholesome thing that is one”. (Kranz 1994 : 82).

⁵ In German, the word Welt could mean “world”, as well as the “universe” and the “cosmos”. The word Welt in German has got a wide range of meanings. For this reason all the meanings of the word Welt should be considered.

play (das Spiel) of Zeus, or in terms that is more appropriate for physics, it is the play of fire (des Feuers) with itself; ...” (Nietzsche 1954c : 374) . As it could have been understood from this statement as well, Nietzsche, matches, the word αἰὼν placed as a subject in the 52nd fragment of Heraclitus with Zeus and with his physical counterpart, the fire. Again a little after this quotation, while he says “Äon is playing this game with himself” (und dieses Spiel spielt der Äon mit sich) (Nietzsche 1954c : 376 – 77) he is using Äon which is the German form of the word αἰὼν. Accordingly the interpretation by Nietzsche to the word αἰὼν that has been used as a subject in the 52nd fragment of Heraclitus now should be understood as the “great child” Zeus playing (Nietzsche 1954b: 826) or with an expression that is more appropriate for physics, with fire⁶. Zeus, or the “great child”⁷ with attributions such as Äon, αἰὼν and fire had been made, has been playing a game with himself. And according to Nietzsche, Heraclitus is providing an answer to the question in this fragment which is in fact important and which could give an unrest otherwise: “Play” is the answer to the question “How is it possible that pure fire takes shapes that are so far from purity?” (Nietzsche 1954c : 376 – 377) . It is only with the “play” of the eternal and pure fire that the countless transformation finds its own place and multiplies itself: “Being one is at the same time being many only with this sense of the word” (Nietzsche 1954c : 374) . Accordingly the drive of play that always evokes ever new (immer neu erwachende Spieltrieb) gives life to different other worlds. The pure fire transforms itself to earth and water with this drive (Sich verwandelnd in Wasser und Erde) . (Nietzsche 1954c : 376 – 77) Along with this, these lines are not in relation to “whether this play has got a purpose or not or whether there is a target that it is directed towards or not” or “what is the aim of this great child by playing”. The quotations are more related to what the play brings, and to the thing(s) that come out along with this play. Whereas the question of why with regard to the play had been made an issue of especially by Heidegger and then later by Derrida and Gadamer from the point of view “whether the play had an aim or not”.⁸ On the other hand, Nietzsche does not only stop at interpreting the word αἰὼν with these words, but at the same time brings out the deeper meaning of the fragment on the whole. The connections of “play” with “αἰὼν” and the connections of “αἰὼν” with “kingly power” and its consequences are being laid down by the above mentioned lines.

When we take a look at Heidegger, we come across an interpretation that is similar to the Nietzsche like interpretation of Heraclitus’s statement. Heidegger is loyal to the interpretation of the word αἰὼν by Nietzsche. However, he also mentions that this word is another name for *logos*. He provides the connection of the word with *logos* as follows: “Only when we contemplated what *logos* meant for Heraclitus in early Greek thinking did it become clear that this word simultaneously names being (Sein) and ground/reason (Grund), naming both in terms of their belonging-together. Heraclitus uses different

⁶ After Nietzsche, Eugen Fink had also pointed out that against the interpretation by Heidegger of *aion* as *logos* and *physis*, he insisted that this word could be comprehended best by making a reference to fire. (Krell 1972 : 65 – 66)

⁷ Nietzsche uses the phrase “a high simile” (ein erhabenes Gleichnis) for the use of the word “child” by Heraclitus and he mentions that only in the play of the artists and children in this world there is becoming and perishing, doing and destruction, outside the moral responsibilities (Nietzsche 1954c : 376 – 77)

⁸ And for any detailed consideration of this point, see (Dursun 2007)

names to name what he names *logos*, names which are the basic words of his thinking; *physis*, the emerging-on-its-own (von – sich – her – Aufgehen), which at the same time essentially comes to be as a self-concealing; *cosmos*, which for the Greeks simultaneously meant order, disposition (fügung), and finery which, as flash and luster, brings about a shining; finally, that which hails him as *logos*, as the sameness of being and ground/reason (Grund), Heraclitus names *aion*” (Heidegger 1991 : 112 – 113 ; 1997 : 168 – 169).

According to Heidegger, *logos* in the meaning of being and grounds belonging to each other is *aion*. Whereas at the same time it is *cosmos* and *physis*. So, all these names always mark the same thing, they always mark *aion*. Heidegger translates the word *aion* as “the worldly time”. Which is “the world that worlds and temporalizes in that, as *cosmos*” (Heidegger 1991 : 112 – 113 ; 1997 : 168 – 169) . In other words, if we are to say it in Nietzsche’s terms, the physical attribution to *aion*, is its way that transforms itself to earth and to water. Or it is the *cosmos* that appears, takes shape and becomes worldly as temporal and *physis*. All of these are one and the same thing. If we are to dwell upon this shortly, it will be appropriate to say a few things about *logos* and *physis* at this point. First and foremost, in the Heidegger meaning of the word, as it had been known earlier on, it is no more enough to get *logos* only as “the word and the reason” and *physis* only as “the nature”. There is a new point of view required for these meanings of *logos* and *physis* or if we were to speak in Heidegger’s terms, it is required to “listen” to “the conversations” of these historical concepts with a new hearing.

Heidegger says, “the Greek noun *logos* belongs to the verb *legein*. It means “to gather, to lay one beside the other”. (Heidegger 1991 : 107 ; 1997 : 160) . “To gather and to collect” but “to gather and to collect” what? And where? At this point another naming, *physis* should have been referred to. *Physis* is “the arising of something from out of itself”. *Physis* is a *poiesis* (creation) . Because says Heidegger, “what presences by means of *physis* has the irruption belonging to bringing-forth, e.g. the bursting of a blossom in bloom, in itself”. (Heidegger 1993 : 317). The thing that has been collected, accumulated, and laid on, finds the opportunity to come out from the *physis*, finds the opportunity to be the emerging-on-its-own (von – sich – her – Aufgehen). *Physis* is the one making come out and coming out, opens towards outside and makes open towards outside. It is the one that reveals its secret. For this reason, it is the one that conceals (Heidegger 1991 : 64 – 65 ; 1997 : 94 – 95) . It is what shelters such an possibility. At the same time, “to provide the possibility for becoming is what *legein* and *logos* words want to say” (Caputo 2002 : 433) . Accordingly *logos* and *physis* name the same thing from this point of view. “the one making itself lay forward, the one that lays one beside the other, the one making itself the emerging-on-its-own” and the one “that plays” are all one and the same thing. Accordingly Heidegger, demands us to think of Heraclitus’s αἰὼν’s in the light of these said meanings.

Heidegger does not stop at this point and adds one more name to the names of *aion*: The *Geschick* of being. He makes a connection between the “child” in the fragment of Heraclitus and the “child playing” with the same thing. “The *Geschick*⁹ of being: a child that plays” and

⁹ The word *Geschick* used by Heidegger means “fate, destiny” as well as “skill” in the German language. And it also has the meaning of “sending”. By some of the interpreters it had been translated as “mission” (Caputo 1986 : 73). Accordingly, all these meanings have to be taken into consideration.

on top of it "[this] the greatest royal child is that mystery of the play in which humans are engaged throughout their life, that play in which their essence is at stake." (Heidegger 1991: 112 – 113 ; 1997 : 168 – 169) . The *Geschick* of the being, being a child showing the skill of playing, is more or less within a quality that explains why "the kingship is belonging to the child". Because there remains simply a play and this "simply" (nur) is everything, the one and the only" (Heidegger 1991 : 112 – 113 ; 1997 : 168 – 169). The child that plays "only" this game is this royal child. After such an interpretation has been brought for the beginning and the end of the fragment, what remains is the following question that we have mentioned above: "Why does it play, the great child of the world play (Weltspiel) Heraclitus brought into view in the aion?"(Heidegger 1991 : 112 – 113 ; 1997 : 168 – 169) . The answer has been provided by Heidegger in the most clear manner: "The "because" withers away (versinken) in the play. The play is without "why". It plays since it plays" (Heidegger 1991 : 112 – 113 ; 1997 : 168 – 169). The reason of the playing of this play is without "why". Because, "because" is embedded in the play. Heidegger says that the play is without why but at the same time he also says that "Nothing is without ground/reason". (Heidegger 1991 : 112 – 113 ; 1997 : 168 – 169). So what is the relationship between the grounds (Grund) and the play? The question is important and Heidegger gives the answer to it in his work, *Der Satz vom Grund*. But for the time being, under the present we could say that for Heidegger, as it had been for Nietzsche, this fragment of Heraclitus has become a milestone in their thoughts on play.

We should mention that the interest of Heraclitus in play other than the 52nd fragment, is the 70th fragment. This fragment is also related to play just like the 52nd fragment. The fragment is as follows : "Παιδῶν ἀθύρματα νενόμικεν εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα δοξάσματα." And the translation by Kranz of this fragment is "the child's play (according to God) is the thoughts of the human beings" (Kranz 1994 : 66) . Another translation is "he used to call the human thoughts, a child's play¹⁰" (Rifat 2003 : 57) . Of course this saying by Heraclitus is to point out that the human thoughts are also a play. Along with this, Krell conveys as follows while he is interpreting Heidegger, to tell the relationship between Aion's play and the play of the human thoughts: "if one thinks *logos* as the relation of man and Being, then his thought approaches the wisdom of the playing child. His thoughts are indeed 'the playthings of children'." (Krell 1972 : 65 – 66) . So, the playful relationship between the humanly play and "that great child" could be formed by *logos* that we have mentioned above in the Heidegger's meaning of it. This playful relationship especially between being (Sein) and Dasein, had been examined deeply by Heidegger.¹¹

Now we could take a look at the philosophy of Plato since it provides important tools both in this connection and in our examination of the play and its onto-theological origin.

Especially if we look at it from the point of view of the interpretation that has been brought to the fragment, both of the meanings of the word as "fate" and as "skill" should be thought of simultaneously.

¹⁰ Here ἀθύρματα comes from the root of ἀθύρω (I am playing) and expresses playing with a few little differences as παίζων, παίζω (I am Playing) in the 52nd fragment. While the former has got meanings such as "play something", "play a game" , "entertain himself", the latter has got meanings such as "to play like a child", "to dance", etc ...

¹¹ The relevant section can be found in (Dursun, 2007)

2. Plato and Human as a Puppet

We all know what a playful writer Plato was. Both the styles of his texts and the figure of Socrates craftily beats up his rivals in his dialogues or his justification represented in a playful style could be seen as the proofs of this. The playfulness of Plato had not been limited to the texts he had written; at the same time he had provided a certain place for the concept of play in his philosophical scheme. Two concepts are important in Plato's relationship with the concept of play. One of them is the concept of μίμησις (imitation) and the other is θαῦμα (the puppet) . There is a play between the man and God or the Gods and the concept of μίμησις (mimesis) had taken place on the side of the man, whereas the concept of θαῦμα (thauma) had taken place on the side related to the God. On the one hand man is θαῦμα (thauma) in his relationship with God, namely his plaything, his puppet. On the other hand, the man who is the puppet or the plaything, is not at all completely lacking the "will power" . Plato explains the condition of the plaything or the puppet being active in *Laws* as follows : "Let us think about it like this. Let's take it that each and every one of us, the living beings are a puppet (θαῦμα) created by God (θεῖον), this could be a plaything (παίγνιον) for them or something that has been designed seriously, we do not know that, but what we know is that these feelings inside us keep pulling us like a group of nerves and ropes and they push us towards conflicting activities since they are in conflict with each other: Here it is where we could find the distinction between virtue and evil. The reason tells us that everyone always follow one of these, never letting it go, and that one should resist the call of the other nerves ..." (Plato 1998 : 644e – 645a) . As it could be seen, the puppet has the ability to be active and has got reason (λόγος) . He could make a choice with this between virtue and evil. He could take part in the play God or Gods and play with them. With it, he could be the subject of his own play. In addition to this, reason is also "the common law of the city (πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον) " where the puppet is located (Plato 1998 : 645a) . Reason is the basic factor in the governing of the city as well. Accordingly, it is possible for the human being to be virtuous by acting with reason and to make a move in the play of Gods and this possibility shows itself in the governing of the city in accordance with the laws. All right but either a puppet or a play thing, how is the man going to play this game with the God ?

As an answer to this question, Plato's mimesis concept that we have mentioned above is important. By depending on Spariosu, Küchler says that Plato defines play as a type of "good mimesis" (Küchler 1994 : 13) . Namely, this is the man's "being able to establish the connection with the divine by representing the higher play of Gods" (Küchler 1994 : 13). Man "should live in compliance with his role and by playing the best games possible" (Plato 1998 : 803c) . This is the thing making him free and active. And its realisation could be possible by mimesis. From this point of view Plato makes the Athenian talk as follows : "Whereas, our order of state is the imitation (μίμησις) of the best and highest way of life." (Plato 1998 : 817b) . The building up of the ideal state

and the ideal governing of a city shall be possible with the imitation (mimesis)¹² of the best and highest way of life. Man in accordance with his nature of which “a big part is a puppet and some part has got the share of reality” (Plato 1998 : 804b), could set up his ideal state with the help of this mimetic play which he plays with God using his reason. For this purpose what he has to do is to imitate the “ideal” in a playful way. Namely from one hand he has to play games, sing songs and dance (Plato 1998 : 803c). By doing so, he is not only going to take the Gods to his side but; at the same time humans thanks to the “melodies that have been good imitations”, “shall follow such imitations on the way of acquiring virtues” (Plato 1998 : 812c) . They will render themselves freedom from the captivity of those ropes by going through a period of refining by good melodies. And in this way, the virtuous citizens, could have lead lives slightly getting free of being the puppet whose strings are pulled and who is dependent on them, and would have made correct moves. On the other hand, in this “imitation of the best and the highest way of life” “a correct direction should be given that is specifically arousing the desire towards the thing that requires the virtue of his work for becoming a perfect man in his adult ages with his soul” for the child who is at the age of playing (Plato 1998 : 643c-d) . This is the education (παιδεία). Education has got a close relationship with play in the setting up of the ideal state. The education should also be play-like: Plato says in the State; “You should provide the education to be a play for them. Accordingly you will see better what they are inclined to from their nature” (Plato 1971 : 537a) . For Plato it is important that the child should be located in a position for the future that is compatible with his nature. Because virtue is on the other hand, everybody doing his own job. The citizen to be positioned in accordance with his work. A play-like education will put the child in a mould that he is going to be living in, in the future. On this subject Toker says the following : “In that case, play in Plato is a tool to put someone into a certain condition of soul and body, it is the ambiance to put someone into a certain shape that could handle a feeling and an action. Play is a process of shaping a citizen for rendering the action that he is inclined to from his nature in compliance with the purpose of perfection” (Toker 2005 : 11) .

Along with this, play in the Platonic sense, is the way of providing the conditions for making correct moves in the play that the puppet or the man is playing with God or Gods. It is the possibility for making independent moves excluding the things that condition him. The realisation of this possibility is in a mimetic style. Because what is ideal has got an ontology and this ontology could be served as a guide for the correct moves of the man. The style of playing that has been suggested by Plato for the puppet is in respect of the guidance of this ontology. In that case, he plays and joins the play of

¹² Meanwhile it shall be useful if we take a look at the concept of mimesis. According to Spariosu, “the Greek word mimesis (as well as its older relatives, *mimos*, *mimeisthai*, and *mimema*) is as a rule associated with modern concepts of imitation and representation, but this connection is by no means certain before Plato.” (Spariosu 1989 : 17). Spariosu would want to give some of the meanings existing in the concept of mimesis up to the time of Plato, by depending on Gerald Else. These are similes such as hand and face movements that we call mimics (we should also add the sounds to these) in our language as well. Another part of them is one person imitating the other without the mimics. Whereas the other part is the multiplication of signs and characteristics of things and individuals. The claim of Spariosu is his initiative to redefine the meaning and functioning of this concept of Plato “with rational terms” (Spariosu 1989 : 18). In other words, not an “involuntary or semi – voluntary, self-formed” imitation, Platonic mimesis is an imitation and representation where reason itself is in effect.

Gods, because he, as long as he plays with his reason, becomes independent of the pleasures and pains that captivate him and he becomes “self sovereign” (Plato 1998 : 646a). To play with a style that contains reason is “become a perfect citizen on the way to virtue, starting from childhood” (Plato 1998 : 644a) and this is possible by imitating “the ideal” on this path. Accordingly the reasonable mimetic play that the puppet, the plaything or the man plays, is from another angle something that brings him above the Gods that he plays the game with. And from this point of view, “this is his most superior side” (Plato 1998 : 803c).

3. To Conclude

As it can be seen, the understanding of play of Plato, is not entirely detached from the understanding of play of Heraclitus. There is a play and this play’s subject is Aion in the Heraclitus’s meaning, and Theion in the Platonic sense. At this point, it is useful to speak about the onto-theology of play. Because in the Platonic sense, the things we have mentioned above form the context of the concept of onto-theology widely used in the 20th century. According to this, play is related to *theos* and *theion* on the one hand, and on the other hand this relation also has an *ontological* side. When Küchler took a look at the relation of thauma with theos or theion from an ontological point of view, he makes an issue of whether in play, autonomy and presence is in the reach of the human subject or not (Küchler 1994 : 13). As it has been pointed out by this question also, what is present here is the existential relation of the thing that conditions the doings of the human subject with that subject.itself Accordingly, the issue could be formulated again from the “onto” point of “onto theology” as follows : Where does the play takes place? In other words, where is the play-space and what is the ontology of this space? The establishment of this ontological condition is important since all the praxis of man in his relation with play, is within a defined relationship with that ontology. And the man’s theoria which is a close relative of that praxis is included in this defined relationship. From this point of view, perhaps all of the human doings is in a defined relationship with this ontology and it becomes naturally important whether the man is passive, active or in any other position in this defined relationship.

So, from this point of view, when the conception of Platonic play is taken into consideration along with Heraclitus, the Platonic understanding of play is an important mile stone in general terms in the onto-theology of play and in specific terms in the ontology of play.

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